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1. INTRODUCTION
On November 25, 2003, the Council reached a political accord on
amending the Merger Control Regulation. On January 20, 2003, the
Council formally adopted the amendment as new Regulation No. 139/2004.
On December 16, 2003, the Commission issued a Notice regarding
horizontal mergers, explaining the Commission's review criteria. The new
regulation and the Commission's Notice will become effective on May 1,
2004. Article 2, Sec. 3 of the new regulation provides: "A concentration
which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with
the common market."'
The former Article 2, § 3 provided: "[a] concentration which creates
or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common
market.",
2
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'Council Regulation 139/2004/EEC of 20 January 2004 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1
[hereinafter EC Merger Regulation].
2 Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 24:715 (2004)
The decisive criterion in the former test was the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position. The criterion concerning the
impediment of effective competition, on the other hand, was accorded little
independent significance. The amendment of the merger control regulation
has reversed this relationship. Now the sole criterion for disallowance is
whether the merger will significantly impede effective competition. The
creation or strengthening of a dominant position is listed solely as an
example of a significant impediment of effective competition. However,
this change, which appears very substantive at first glance, should not be
overestimated. Ultimately, the decisive factors in the evaluation of a
merger are what merger control seeks to achieve and what criteria are used
in reviewing the merger. The primary objective of merger control is still to
protect competition against distortion.3 The review criteria of the first
section of Article 2 remain the same.4 Despite these similarities, however,
the new test can lead to different results in individual cases.
This article begins by outlining the legislative history of the new
Article 2. That preface is followed by the identification and explanation of
the three main reasons for the amendment of Art. 2. First, however, there
will be a very brief explanation of the terms used in this article. This is
necessitated by the unfortunate fact that, in the general discussion and even
in the Commission proposals and the new merger control regulation, the
terms are sometimes imprecisely or even incorrectly used.
II. USE OF TERMS
A merger can have either unilateral or coordinated effects. "Unilateral
effects" are detrimental welfare effects from mergers, resulting in either the
reduction in product volume or the rise in prices by undertakings which act
individually and independently of the reactions of other competitors.5
"Coordinated effects" are detrimental welfare effects which result from
uniform and coordinated interaction by individual undertakings.6
A coordinated interaction oligopoly is also referred to as collusive.
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
3 See, Rationale No. 2 of The EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at para. 2.
4 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the EC Merger
Regulation), EuR. PARL. Doc. (COM 711) (2002), at para. 4.3. However, the former
position of the European Economic and Social Committee was to adopt employment trends
as a review criterion.
5 European Economics, Study on Assessment Criteria for Distinguishing between
Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies in Merger Control (May 2001), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/lib-competition/doc/oligopolies study.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and Dominant
Oligopolies].
6 id.
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The term "collusion" can be broken down into tacit collusion and explicit
collusion.7 Tacit collusion does not occur by means of agreements or
coordinated behavior within the meaning of Art. 81, Sec. 1, of the E.C.
Treaty. Instead, a uniform approach of the members of an oligopoly results
automatically from the market structure. The market structure permits the
coordination of market actions without trading information. Tacit collusion
therefore occurs without coordinated behavior within the meaning of Art.
81 of the E.C. Treaty. In the case of Art. 81 of the E.C. Treaty, the term
autonomous parallel behavior is used in order to differentiate these cases
from coordinated behavior, which do fall within the scope of Art. 81 of the
E.C. Treaty.8 In contrast, explicit collusion occurs by reason of agreements
or other coordinated behavior. Regardless, the end result of both tacit and
explicit collusion is the same: no effective competition occurs.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Already in its 1998 Green Paper, the Commission raised the question
of whether the market dominance test should be continued or whether it
would be better to introduce the Substantial Lessening of Competition Test
("SLC test").9 In the discussion which followed, the majority advocated a
continuance of the market dominance test for reasons of legal certainty.'
0
Proponents of the market dominance test pointed out that the results of the
SLC test in the United States and the market dominance test in Europe are
essentially the same. This position can be summed up with the phrase:
"When it ain't broke, don't fix it."'" There were also significant opposing
voices which called for the introduction of the SLC test. This opposition
argued that the market dominance test did not cover all mergers which had
adverse effects on competition. The market dominance test allegedly had a
gap for mergers which resulted in unilateral effects in oligopolistic markets.
This view can be described with the phrase: "Mind the gap.
'' 2
7id.
8 The term autonomous parallel behavior is more precise since the original meaning of
the term "collusion" implicates an exchange of information and a coordinated behavior of
companies. However, following the common use of terms, "tacit collusion" will be used.
9 Commission of the European Communities Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM. 745) 6 (2001), at para. 1.3,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/green paper/en.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2004).
10 See Submission to the Green Paper on the Review of the Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 4064/89, at http://www.europa.eu.inticomm/competition/mergers/review/
comments.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
1 Mario Monti, EU Competition Policy, in 2002 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST.. 87 (B. Hawk,
Ed. 2003).
12 See John Fingleton & Dermot Nolan, Mind the Gap: Reforming the EU Merger
Regulation, at http://tca.ie/articles.html (May 29, 2003) (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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The Commission's proposal for a new Merger Control Regulation of
December 2002 provided the following compromise: the former reasons
for prohibition would be retained. However, the term "dominant market
position" was to be defined in a new Section 2. The proposed new Section
2 provided:
For the purpose of this Regulation, one or more undertakings shall be
deemed to be in a dominant position if, with or without coordinating,
they hold the economic power to influence appreciably and sustainably
the parameters of competition, in particular, prices, production, quality
of output, distribution or innovation, or appreciably to foreclose
competition.13
The Commission wanted to retain the market dominance test for
reasons of legal certainty. At the same time, with the new definition of
dominant position, it wanted to make clear that the market dominance test
permits the prohibition of mergers in very specific oligopolistic situations in
which the merging undertakings would be able to raise prices unilaterally
and to exercise market power without coordinating their behavior
(colluding) and without necessarily possessing the largest market share.
14
Thus, the definition was meant to close the gap complained of in the market
dominance test. Moreover, the new definition was meant to establish a
stronger correspondence between merger regulation and the economic
effects of mergers. 15
In its response to the Commission's proposal, the European Parliament
proposed that the Commission's intended definition of market dominance
be stricken. 16  The European Parliament feared that the new definition
would result in more legal uncertainty, rather than in clarity concerning the
assessment of mergers, inasmuch as the new definition would apply to
almost any merger.
Finally, in the Council's meetings on November 25-26, 2003, a new
compromise was adopted. The council agreed to introduce a new test,
similar to the SLC test, but with an addition stating that the creation or
strengthening of a dominant market position constitutes a substantial
impediment of effective competition.
The rationales for introducing the new test can be broken down into
13 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Regarding the Control of Mergers By
Undertakings of 11 December 2002, 2003 O.J. (C 20) 4.
14 Id. at 54.
"5 Id. at 56, n.18.
16 Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on the control of concentrations
between undertakings: "The EC Merger Regulation," EuR. PARL. Doc. (COM 711) A5-0257
(2003).
17 id.
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three distinct goals. First, the new test is designed to close the alleged gap
in the market dominance test. Second, the new test is meant to harmonize
with U.S. law. Third, legal certainty is assured through the reference to the
creation or strengthening of a dominant market position.
IV. MIND THE GAP
The main reason for the modification of the substantive test was the
closure of the gap thought to exist in the old market dominance test. The
former market dominance test is briefly described here in order to permit a
comparison with the new test.
A. The Former Market Dominance Test
Under the former Merger Control Regulation, a merger was prohibited
if it resulted in individual or collective market dominance.
(1) Individual Market Dominance
The Commission and the case law define a dominant market position
as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its
consumers."18 The question of whether an undertaking after the merger will
have the power to behave independently requires an independent
examination.
In analyzing a dominant market position, the relevant product and
geographic market must first be determined, in order to filter out
competitive forces which affect the undertakings involved.' 9  The
Commission determines the relevant market using the demand market
concept. According to this test, products which market opponents view as
interchangeable belong to the same market. In a second step, the
Commission must decide whether the undertaking has a dominant position
in this market. The Commission first looks at the undertaking's market
position, and, in doing so, is largely concerned with market shares.
Thereafter, the Commission looks at the influence of the opposite side of
the market on the merging undertakings, and, in a third step, determines the
competitive pressure exerted by potential competitors.2 °
18 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental B.V. v. Commission,
1978 ECR 1-207, at para. 65. See also Case No. IV/M042, Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 48; Case No. IV/M004, Renault/Volvo, 1990 O.J. (L 281).
19 Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of
Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, at para. 2.
20 See, e.g., Case No. IV/M053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42;
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The decisive element in the review of the individual market dominance
is the competitive pressure influencing the undertaking. If such competitive
pressure is no longer strong enough, then the undertaking has freedom to
act autonomously within the meaning of Art. 2 of the Merger Control
Regulation.
(2) Collective Market Dominance
"Collective market dominance" is understood to mean the dominant
market position of a number of undertakings which are independent of one
another in a reference market. The European Court established in its
seminal decision Kali und Salz that merger control may also apply to
collective market dominance. 2' According to this decision, several
undertakings possess a dominant market position if they "together, in
particular because of correlative factors which exist between them, are able
to adopt a common policy on the market and act to a considerable extent
independently of their competitors, their customers, and also of
consumers." z2 This definition contains two conditions: first, the
undertakings must have a common market approach. This means that they
may not be in competition with one another. Second, the undertakings must
be capable of acting independently of external competitors and buyers.
Thus, the members of the oligopoly should also not be subject to any
significant external competition.
These basic requirements were developed by Commission practice
23
and especially through decisions by the Court of First Instance ("CF").24
That development first took its ultimate shape in the CFI's Airtours
decision.25  The CFI stated in its decision that a collective market
domination could result from a merger if that merger, by reason of market
conditions and change in the market structure, created a situation where:
each member of the dominant oligopoly, as it becomes aware of
common interests, considers it possible, economically rational, and
hence preferable, to adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the
market with the aim of selling at above competitive prices, without
having to enter into an agreement or resort to a concerted practice
within the meaning of Article 81 of E.C. Treaty and without any
Green Paper, supra note 9, at para. 5.
21 Case C-68/94 and C-30/95, France v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, at para. 221.
22 id.
23 Case IV/M.619, Gencor/Lonrho, 1996 O.J. (C 247) 19; Case IV/M.1225, Enso/Stora,
O.J. 1999 (L 254) 9; Case IV/M.1524, Airtours/First Choice, O.J. 2000 (L 93) 1.
24 Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, at para. 276; Case T-
342/1999, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, at para. 62.
25 Airtours, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, at para. 62.
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actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers,
being able to react effectively. 26
In the Airtours judgment, the CFI pointed out that the Commission had
failed to provide sufficient evidence for coordinated action. It made
unmistakably clear that coordinated action by members of the oligopoly did
not require structural connections or coordinated behavior within the
meaning of Art. 81 of the E.C. Treaty. Instead, it is enough if the merger so
alters market conditions that members of the oligopoly are able to make
strategic decisions upon consideration of the likely behavior of the other
members of the oligopoly and that there is no longer any effective
competition among the members of the oligopoly (tacit collusion).
In order to assume such a dominant market position, the CFI required
27that the following three conditions be present. First, each member of the
dominant oligopoly had to be able to gain information concerning the
behavior of the other members, in order to determine whether or not they
were coordinating their actions. For this, the market had to be sufficiently
transparent. Second, there had to be a reason for the undertakings to not
deviate from such behavior on the market, so that tacit market coordination
could occur. This reason was said to be present only if there are adequate
deterrents to prevent deviation from the common parallelism. Each
member of the oligopoly had to know that any strongly competitive
initiative on its part to acquire a greater market share would trigger a similar
measure by the other members of the oligopoly, so that there was no
advantage to be gained from its initiative. Third, the CFI required that the
anticipated response of the actual and potential competitors as well as
consumers did not cast into question the anticipated results of the common
action.
The essence of the collective market dominance is that, due to
conditions on the market, the members of the oligopoly can tacitly
coordinate their behavior and can approach the market commonly without
regard for their buyers or for those outside the oligopoly. Thus, collective
market dominance "only" covers the coordinated effects of mergers.
B. Substantial Impediment to Effective Competition
According to the Draft Commission Notice regarding the control of
horizontal mergers, there are three ways in which mergers can significantly
impede effective competition.28 In the notice passed by the Commission it
26 Id. at para. 61.
27 Id. at para. 62.
28 Draft Commission Notice on the appraisal of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Dec. 11, 2002, at para.
11, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/ (last visited
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differentiates between mergers which result in coordinated effects and
mergers which result in non coordinated (unilateral) effects. But in the end,
in the same notice, the Commission differentiates between three different
effects of mergers.
2 9
First, a merger can create or strengthen a dominant market position. 30
This category corresponds to the prior individual market dominance
category. The Commission reviews whether an undertaking, by reason of
its market position, can behave independently of its competitors. In
evaluating the market position, the Commission looks primarily to the
market share.3 ' It also considers the vertical integration of the undertaking
and its economic power and financial strength. Thereafter, the Commission
looks at whether the opposite side of the market compensates for the growth
of power resulting from the merger and whether competition is still
preserved, despite the merger, through new market entries by competitors in
the future.
Second, a merger can supposedly change the competitive structure in
an oligopolistic market such that market participants that did not previously
coordinate their market behavior are now able to coordinate it and therefore
are able to raise prices. Moreover, the merger could supposedly facilitate
the coordination of market behavior by market participants that have
previously coordinated their behavior (colluded).32 With this category, the
Commission covers the "coordinated effects" of merger. This category
therefore corresponds to collective market dominance. In its draft Notice,
the Commission sets forth the conditions established by the CFI in its
Airtours decision.
Finally, a merger can supposedly reduce the extent of competition in
an oligopolistic market if it eliminates important competitive barriers for
one or more market participants and enables them to raise prices.33 This
can also happen where the oligopolists do not coordinate their behavior.
This category is new. It is intended to close the gap thought to exist in the
former test.3 This gap can be illustrated with a simple example. There are
four big participants in a given market: participant A and B each have a
market share of roughly 15%. Participants C and D each have a market
share of roughly 30%. Participants A and B merge. The market is not
Feb. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Draft Notice].
29 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 8, at
para. 25 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers].




34 See Rationale No. 25 of EC Merger Regulation, supra note 2.
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transparent, so that coordination among the remaining three participants
cannot be proven. Despite the small number of market participants and
symmetrical market share distribution, the merger cannot be prohibited on
grounds of collective market dominance. None of the undertakings has
individual market dominance since each undertaking still faces two strong
competitors. But this merger is prima facie anticompetitive.3 5 The new
category is specifically intended to cover such mergers.
In its Draft Notice, the Commission describes the criteria which serve
as the basis for the review of mergers in an oligopoly which do not result in
coordinated effects.3 6 The Commission states in its notice that a merger
raises serious competition concerns only when the aggregate Herfindahl-
Hirschmann-Index (HHI)37 is between 1000 and 2000 and rises by at least
250 points or the aggregate HHI is above 2000 and rises at least 150 points.
The Commission, in its Draft Notice, further distinguishes between
markets in which competition exists primarily at the production/capacity
level (Cournot Oligopoly Model) and markets in which the decisive
competition parameter is the price (Bertrand Oligopoly Model).3" If the
competition is more on the production/capacity level, then, according to its
Notice, the Commission will look at whether the reduction of competitive
pressure creates an incentive for the merging undertakings to reduce their
capacities and raise prices or whether the other competitors are able to
compensate for the production reduction by the merging undertakings 9 In
markets where competition is primarily on price, the Commission will look
primarily at how readily the goods offered by the merging undertakings can
be substituted. If the goods are very similar, then the mer er will raise
greater concerns than it would if they were more dissimilar. 0 Moreover,
the Commission will analyze factors such as market entries, purchasing
power and business efficiencies.
Unfortunately, the Notice is extremely scant on explaining the
assessment criteria for the review of mergers in this category. This is
understandable since there is as currently very little any case law or
Commission practice to draw on, which of course creates legal
uncertainties. On the other hand, this lack of explanation is even more
remiss with regard to mergers in this category, because legal uncertainties
35 See, John Kay, Rule of Thumb, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2002.
36 Draft Notice, supra note 28, at para. 25.
37 The so-called HHI is the sum of the squared market shares. In the example, the HHI
prior to the merger would be 2250 points (152 + 152 + 302 + 302). The aggregate HHI after
the merger would be 2700 points (302 + 302 + 302).
38 See Criteria for Distinguishing between Competitive and Dominant Oligopolies, supra
note 5 (regarding different oligopoly theories).
39 Draft Notice, supra note 28, at para. 30.
40 Id. at para. 34.
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are a definite danger to arise in this particular area.
In summary, it can be said that the Commission will continue to use
the same review criteria such as market position, barriers to market entry,
and demand in evaluating mergers. As to mergers in an oligopoly, the
Commission will be able, in the future, to prohibit these on the grounds of
unilateral effects. Whether the Commission can thereby prohibit mergers
more easily will depend in large part on what evidentiary showing the
courts will require regarding unilateral effects in oligopolies.
V. HARMONIZATION WITH U.S. LAW
A further argument for the introduction of the new test is
harmonization with U.S. law. Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, mergers
can be prohibited if their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."'4 The U. S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission have issued joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines
("U.S. Merger Guidelines") in which they set forth their merger review
criteria.42 These review criteria have been confirmed by case law. In these
U.S. Merger Guidelines, the competition authorities distinguish between a
lessening of competition through coordinated interaction and through
unilateral effects. They base their review on substantially the same criteria
as those used by the European Commission and by the European courts. As
underscored in the introduction, the "unifying theme" of the U.S. Merger
Guidelines is "that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise. ' 3 Not surprisingly, decisions on
both sides of the Atlantic rarely differ.
The General Electric/Honeywell case did, however, demonstrate a few
differences in the evaluation of mergers. 44 General Electric and Honeywell
were current or potential competitors in several markets. The
Commission's concerns about the merger were largely based on the product
line diversity and exclusion effects, inasmuch as the undertakings could
combine largely complementary business sectors. The Commission feared
that the strengthening of General Electric's financial power and the vertical
integration of business sectors of both undertakings, as well as the
combination of complementary products, would permit the merging
41 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27 (2002).
42 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, Apr. 8, 1997, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/
hmg1.html (last visited March 4, 2004).
" Id. at 2.
44 Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with
the common market and the EEA agreement, Case No. COMP/M.2220, General
Electric/Honeywell, available at http://europa.eu.int/commI/competition/mergers/cases/
decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
The New E. C. Merger Control Test
24:715 (2004)
undertakings to expel other competitors from the market. Ultimately, the
merger would have detrimental effects on product quality, service and
price.45  The U.S. Department of Justice, by contrast, viewed the
combinability of the complementary products as an argument for clearing
the merger, inasmuch as the products could then be offered to customers at
lower prices.46 The U.S. Department of Justice rejected as speculative the
Commission's citation of the long-term effects of being expelled from the
market. The divergent evaluations of the merger in this case were likely
due to the fact that they were considered at two different points in time.
The case illustrates the different attitudes of the competition authorities
regarding the evaluation of business efficiencies. With the reform of the
Merger Control Regulation, the Commission's attitude toward business
efficiencies achieved through merger could be approaching the positive
evaluation of these by U.S. competition authorities. Until now, the
Commission's rulings have not shown that it can be persuaded by the
efficiencies argument to grant a clearance.47  In a few rulings, the
Commission has even regarded efficiencies as a negative factor, inasmuch
as these increase the undertaking's lead over its competitors and therefore
support the argument that they contribute to the creation or strengthening of
a dominant market position.48
Rationale Number 29 in the new Regulation No. 139/2004 now
challenges the courts and the Commission to consider in their merger
review efficiencies arguments by the participating undertakings. 49 Now it is
supposedly possible that efficiencies resulting from a merger may
compensate for the effects of the merger on competition, especially the
damages to the consumers, so that effective competition is not significantly
impeded by the merger. In its Notice regarding the evaluation of horizontal
mergers, the Commission indicated the conditions under which it will
consider such efficiencies. These conditions are based on the conditions
contained in the U.S. Merger Guidelines. The undertakings involved have
to demonstrate that the increased efficiencies are directly beneficial to the
consumer, are causally connected to the merger, are broad and will occur
without major delay. 50  Moreover, the Commission will consider
45 id.
46 U.S. Department of Justice, Range Effects: The United States Perspective 23 (Oct. 12,
2001) (discussing the EC's decision regarding the GE/Honeywell acquisition).
47 See Aerospatiale, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42, at para. 65; Gencor, 1996 O.J. (C 247) 19, at
para. 213; Case IV/M.774, Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM, 1997 O.J. (L 247) 1, at
para. 244.
48 See Case IV/M.050, AT&T/NCR, 1991 O.J. (C 016) 1, at para. 28; Case IV/M.130
Delta Air Lines/Pan Am, 1991 O.J. (C 289) 1, at para. 20.
49 EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at 4.
50 Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, supra note 29, at
para. 76.
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efficiencies only in cases where adequate competitive pressure is present. If
the undertakings can demonstrate the existence of these conditions, the
Commission can conclude that the increased efficiencies outweigh the
feared anticompetitive effects of the merger and allow the merger.
What importance the defense of increased efficiencies will have in
practice cannot be predicted at this point. However, it will most likely have
a rather small part to play, given the great difficulty of proving or
anticipating increased efficiencies. Thus, there has yet to be a case in the
U.S. where an anticompetitive merger was allowed on the basis of an
efficiencies defense. Nonetheless, the undertakings should draw the
Commission's attention early on to possible increased efficiencies of the
merger and then to quantify these, if possible.
During the last few years, E.U. competition law has increasingly come
to resemble U.S. law. Even before the amendment of the Merger Control
Regulation, the Commission and the U.S. competition authorities applied
substantially the same criteria in a merger analysis.5' With this amendment
to the Merger Control Regulation, now even the language of the text is
similar to U.S. law. But despite this similarity of language, there can still
be diverging decisions by the competition authorities in the future. This is
due in part to the differing effects of mergers in the United States and the
European Union. Also, a merger's effects on competition can be evaluated
differently even if the same facts and the same test language are used.
Thus, in complicated merger cases, even the Commissioners of the Federal
Trade Commission arrive at different views regarding the effects on
competition of a merger.
VI. LEGAL CERTAINTY THROUGH RETENTION OF THE MARKET
DOMINANCE TEST AS REGULATORY EXAMPLE
The purpose of identifying the creation or strengthening of a dominant
market position as an example of significant impediment of effective
competition is to let earlier court decisions and Commission rulings
continue to serve as authority for evaluating mergers.52 The listing of
market dominance as a regulatory example and the retention of the
evaluation criteria in Section 1 of Article 2 of the Merger Control
Regulation demonstrate that, in the future, the same standards for the
evaluation of mergers will be used as what was employed in the past. It is
standard legal practice to review a case in terms of the specific regulatory
provision before examining the generalized one. Thus, the first element of
51 See BundesKartellamt, Discussion paper for the meeting of the Working Group on
Competition Law, Prohibition Criteria in Merger Control - Dominant Position versus
Substantial Lessening of Competition (Oct. 9, 2001), available at http://
www.bundeskartellamt.de/ProPap0 1 -Mantel-e.pdf.
52 EC Merger Regulation, supra note 1, at 4.
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review is whether the merger creates or strengthens a dominant market
position. If this is the case, then without further examination a significant
impediment to effective competition can generally be assumed. This
approach offers the advantage that, for most mergers, the former market
dominance test can basically still be used.
Legal uncertainty remains, however, concerning mergers which occur
in a close oligopoly, but are possibly not covered by the previous collective
market dominance test. For these cases, the regulatory example of the
creation or strengthening of a dominant market position obviously does not
provide any help. Legal certainty in this case can be obtained only through
the publication of evaluation criteria. Unfortunately, the Commission's
Notice regarding the evaluation of horizontal mergers is very scant on this
very category of an oligopoly without coordination. For the undertakings
involved there is still legal uncertainty which should not be underestimated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The new test of the Merger Control Regulation probably does not
constitute a true cultural change. The Commission will continue to base its
evaluation of mergers on an analysis of the merging undertakings' market
position, the structure of the opposite side of the market, and potential
competition. There is a change, however, for mergers which result in a
close oligopoly in which no single competitor has an outstanding market
position. In such cases, the Commission will examine the merger not only
with regard to coordinated effects, but will also examine, based on the
market conditions, whether the merger will lead to a price increase or a
reduction in production capacity through unilateral effects. It is yet to be
seen what proof the courts will require regarding the unilateral effects in
oligopolies. Therefore, for this category, there is greater legal uncertainty
that cannot be eliminated by identifying market dominance in Article 2 of
the Merger Control Regulation as the regulatory example.
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